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The Resource Page:
Focus on Judicial Campaign-Conduct Rules
Editor’s Note: There are about 8,500 state general-jurisdiction
trial-court judges in the United States; of those, 77% stand for
some sort of contestable election and 87% stand for some form of
election. There are about 1,250 state appellate judges in the
United States; of those, 53% stand for some sort of contestable
election and 87% stand for some form of election. (See Court
Review, Summer 2004, at 21.) In addition, there are thousands of
additional, limited-jurisdiction judges also subject to election.
Thus, the rules governing election-campaign conduct by judges are
of great significance.
In 2002, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the
United States Supreme Court held a broadly written provision of
the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct that prevented judicial
candidates from “announcing” positions on issues violated the
First Amendment. On remand in that same case in August 2005,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held two
more provisions of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct—the
partisan-activities and solicitation clauses—unconstitutional.
Whether the United States Supreme Court again takes the case
to provide its guidance or not (a request for review is pending), the
Eighth Circuit’s opinion will have broad impact, at least for the
near term. State supreme courts will continue their struggles to
rewrite codes of judicial conduct to meet both the state interests
perceived to apply and the limits being placed upon those codes by
the federal courts. And judicial candidates will continue their
efforts both to succeed in contested elections and to comply with
the codes of conduct.
Therefore, we reprint here substantial excerpts from the Eighth
Circuit’s opinion, as well as from the dissenting opinion of three
members of that court. We have deleted all of the footnotes and
most of the citations. For the few Supreme Court cases cited by the
court to which we have retained the reference, they are simply
noted by name and year.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Republican Party of Minnesota, et al.,
vs.
Suzanne White, et al.,
416 F.3d 738 (Aug. 2, 2005).

[*744] BEAM, Circuit Judge.
This case is before us en banc upon remand from the United
States Supreme Court. We briefly outline what has occurred in
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this matter since its inception, believing that it will be helpful
in analyzing the issues presented.
The dispute commenced in the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota. At issue were the so called
“announce,” “partisan-activities,” and “solicitation” clauses of
Canon 5 of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s canons of judicial
conduct. The district court rejected Appellants’ First and
Fourteenth Amendment claims, Republican Party of Minn. v.
Kelly (D. Minn. 1999), and granted summary judgment to
Appellees: the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards, the
Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, and the
Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility. On
appeal, a divided panel of this court affirmed the district court.
Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly (8th Cir. 2001). We denied
Appellants’ en banc suggestion. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and held, Republican Party of Minn. v. White (2002),
that the announce clause violates the First Amendment,
reversing our holding in Kelly. The Court remanded the case
for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Upon
remand, the same panel, divided as before, again affirmed the
district court’s ruling on the solicitation clause and remanded
for further consideration in light of White of the partisan-activities clause. We granted Appellants’ request for en banc review,
vacating the panel opinion. Today, we find that the partisanactivities and solicitation clauses also violate the First
Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the district court and
remand the case with instructions to enter summary judgment
in favor of Appellants.
The Supreme Court’s remand requires us to consider two
issues in light of White: the constitutional viability of the partisan-activities and solicitation clauses of Canon [*745] 5. . . .
I. BACKGROUND

Canon 5A(1) and 5B(1), the partisan-activities clause, and
B(2), the solicitation clause, rein in the political speech and
association of judicial candidates in Minnesota. The partisanactivities clause states, in relevant part:
Except as authorized in Section 5B(1), a judge
or a candidate for election to judicial office shall
not:
(a) identify themselves as members of a political
organization, except as necessary to vote in an
election;
....
(d) attend political gatherings; or seek, accept or
use endorsements from a political organization.
Section 5B(1)(a) provides that “[a] judge or a candidate for
election to judicial office may . . . speak to gatherings, other
than political organization gatherings, on his or her own
behalf.” (emphasis added). The solicitation clause states,
A candidate shall not personally solicit or accept

campaign contributions or personally solicit
publicly stated support. A candidate may, however, establish committees to conduct campaigns
for the candidate through media advertisements,
brochures, mailings, candidate forums and other
means not prohibited by law. Such committees
may solicit and accept campaign contributions,
manage the expenditure of funds for the candidate’s campaign and obtain public statements of
support for his or her candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting and
accepting campaign contributions and public
support from lawyers, but shall not seek, accept
or use political organization endorsements. Such
committees shall not disclose to the candidate
the identity of campaign contributors nor shall
the committee disclose to the candidate the identity of those who were solicited for contribution
or stated public support and refused such solicitation. A candidate shall not use or permit the
use of campaign contributions for the private
benefit of the candidate or others.
[*746] The facts of this case demonstrate the extent to
which these provisions chill, even kill, political speech and
associational rights. In his 1996 bid for a seat as an associate
justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, appellant Gregory
Wersal (and others working on his behalf) identified himself as
a member of the Republican Party of Minnesota, attended and
spoke at the party’s gatherings, sought the endorsement of the
party, and personally solicited campaign contributions. In
response to Wersal’s appearance at and speech to a Republican
Party gathering, a complaint was filed with the Minnesota
Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, alleging that
Wersal’s actions violated Canon 5A(1)(d). Although the
Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility
(OLPR) ultimately dismissed the complaint, the complaint
accomplished its chilling effect. Wersal, fearful that other complaints might jeopardize his opportunity to practice law, withdrew from the race.
Wersal made a second bid for a seat on the Minnesota
Supreme Court in 1998. In 1997 and 1998, Wersal asked the
OLPR for advisory opinions regarding the solicitation and partisan-activities clauses. The OLPR’s response was mixed, stating it would not issue an opinion regarding personal solicitation, in light of proposed amendments to the Canon and the
fact that there were no judicial elections scheduled that
particular year. It also stated that it would enforce the partisanactivities clause. Wersal then initiated this litigation. In the
meantime, he was forced to write several letters to individuals
who had indicated they would speak on his behalf at
Republican Party conventions across the state, asking them not
to do so in order to avoid violating Canon 5 and imploring
them to “please be patient. I hope for a decision from the
Federal Courts soon.” He also had his campaign’s legal counsel
advise the chairman of the Republican Party of Minnesota that
Canon 5 would prohibit Wersal from accepting or using any
endorsement from the party. There is no question that Wersal
sought to work within the confines of Canon 5 even as he

sought to challenge it—confines that in the most direct of ways
restricted his political speech and association, compelling him
at one point to end a political campaign.
II. DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Selection in Minnesota
Minnesota has chosen to elect the judges of its courts.
. . . Some thirty-three states employ some form of contested election for their trial courts of general jurisdiction,
their appellate courts, or both. As federal judges, we confess
some bias in favor of a system for the appointment of
judges. Indeed, there is much to be said for appointing
judges instead of electing them, perhaps the chief reason
being the avoidance of potential conflict between the selection process and core [*747] constitutional protections. In
promoting the newly drafted United States Constitution,
Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 78 that if the people were
to choose judges through either an election or a process
whereby electors chosen by the people would select them,
the judges would harbor “too great a disposition to consult
popularity to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws.” Arguably, concerns about judicial independence and partisan influence,
posited by Minnesota as grounds for regulating judicial
election speech, are generated, fundamentally, not by the
exercise of political speech or association, but by concerns
surrounding the uninhibited, robust and wide-open
processes often involved in the election of judges in the first
place. As Justice O’Connor noted in her White concurrence,
“the very practice of electing judges undermines [an] interest” in an actual and perceived impartial judiciary.
Yet, there is obvious merit in a state’s deciding to elect its
judges, especially those judges who serve on its appellate
courts. It is a common notion that while the legislative and
executive branches under our system of separated powers
make and enforce public policy, it is the unique role of the
judicial branch to interpret, and be quite apart from making
that policy.
But the reality is that “the policymaking nature of appellate courts is clear.” Courts must often fill gaps created by
legislation. And in particular, by virtue of what state appellate courts are called upon to do in the scheme of state government, they find themselves as a matter of course in a
position to establish policy for the state and her citizens. “At
the [state] appellate level, common-law functions such as
the adoption of a comparative fault standard, or the determination of a forced spousal share of intestate property distribution, require a judiciary that is sensitive to the views of
state citizens. The courts’ policy-making power is, of
course, ever subject to the power of the legislature to enact
statutes that override such policy. But that in no way diminishes the reality that courts are involved in the policy
process to an extent that makes election of judges a reasonable alternative to appointment.
Without question, Minnesota may choose (and has
repeatedly chosen) to elect its appellate judges. . . . [*748]
If Minnesota sees fit to elect its judges, which it does, it
must do so using a process that passes constitutional
muster.
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B. The First Amendment and Political Speech
Within this context, Minnesota has enacted Canon 5 in
an effort to regulate judicial elections. In White, the Court
held the announce clause of Canon 5, which prohibits judicial candidates from stating their views on disputed legal
issues, unconstitutional. It falls to us now to determine
whether the partisan-activities and solicitation clauses of
Canon 5 are acceptable under the First Amendment. . . .
Protection of political speech is the very stuff of the First
Amendment. . . . It cannot be disputed that Canon 5’s
restrictions on party identification, speech to political organizations, and solicitation of campaign funds directly limit
judicial candidates’ political speech. Its restrictions [*749]
on attending political gatherings and seeking, accepting, or
using a political organization’s endorsement clearly limit a
judicial candidate’s right to associate with a group in the
electorate that shares common political beliefs and aims.
C. The Strict Scrutiny Framework
Political speech—speech at the core of the First
Amendment—is highly protected. Although not beyond
restraint, strict scrutiny is applied to any regulation that
would curtail it. The strict scrutiny test requires the state to
show that the law that burdens the protected right advances
a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest. Strict scrutiny is an exacting inquiry, such that
“it is the rare case in which . . . a law survives strict
scrutiny.”
1. The Requirement of a Compelling State Interest
Precisely what constitutes a “compelling interest” is
not easily defined. . . . [*750] In general, strict scrutiny
is best described as an end-and-means test that asks
whether the state’s purported interest is important
enough to justify the restriction it has placed on the
speech in question in pursuit of that interest. As one
commentator has said, “the Court’s treatment of governmental interests has become largely intuitive, a kind of
‘know it when I see it’ approach.” . . . . A clear indicator
of the degree to which an interest is “compelling” is the
tightness of the fit between the regulation and the purported interest: where the regulation fails to address significant influences that impact the purported interest, it
usually flushes out the fact that the interest does not rise
to the level of being “compelling.” . . . . [*751]
2. The Need for Narrow Tailoring
Once a state interest is found to be sufficiently compelling, the regulation addressing that interest must be
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. As with the compelling interest determination, whether or not a regulation
is narrowly tailored is evidenced by factors of relatedness
between the regulation and the stated governmental interest. A narrowly tailored regulation is one that actually
advances the state’s interest (is necessary), does not sweep
too broadly (is not overinclusive), does not leave significant influences bearing on the interest unregulated (is not
underinclusive), and could be replaced by no other regulation that could advance the interest as well with less
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infringement of speech (is the least-restrictive alternative).
In short, the seriousness with which the regulation of core
political speech is viewed under the First Amendment
requires such regulation to be as precisely tailored as possible.
D. Minnesota’s Purported Compelling State Interest
In Kelly, Minnesota argued that Canon 5’s restrictions on
judicial candidate speech served a compelling state interest
in maintaining the independence, and the impartiality, of
the state’s judiciary. Minnesota continues to argue that judicial independence, as applied to the issues in this case,
springs from the need for impartial judges. Apparently, the
idea is that a judge must be independent of and free from
outside influences in order to remain impartial and to be so
perceived. Thus, in Kelly, the panel majority understood the
two notions, independence and impartiality, to be interchangeable, as the Supreme Court promptly noted in White.
[*753] In Kelly, the panel majority analyzed the announce,
partisan-activities, and solicitation clauses in light of impartiality as a compelling interest, but failed to define “impartiality.” On appeal, the Supreme Court filled that void by
fleshing out its meaning. Justice Scalia reasoned that impartiality in the judicial context has three potential meanings.
One possible meaning of “impartiality” is a “lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal view.”
Quickly discounting this uncommon use of the word, the
Court said it could not be a compelling interest for a judge
to “lack . . . predisposition regarding the relevant legal
issues in a case” because such a requirement “has never
been thought a necessary component of equal justice.” The
Court reasoned, first, that it is “virtually impossible” to find
a judge who lacks any “preconceptions about the law,” and
second, that it would not be desirable to have such a judge
on the bench. “Proof that a Justice’s mind at the time he
joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of
constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of
qualification, not lack of bias.” We follow the Court’s direction and likewise dismiss the idea that this meaning of
impartiality could be a compelling state interest.
A second possible meaning is a “lack of bias for or
against either party to [a] proceeding.” Calling this the traditional understanding of “impartiality” and the meaning
used by Minnesota and amici in their due process arguments, the Court explained that this notion “guarantees a
party that the judge who hears his case will apply the law to
him in the same way he applies it to any other party.” The
Court implied, and we find it to be substantially evident,
that this meaning of impartiality describes a state interest
that is compelling. . . . [*754]
Being convinced that protecting litigants from biased
judges is a compelling state interest, we turn to the “narrow
tailoring” examination of the partisan-activities clause
under this particular meaning of judicial impartiality.
Because this meaning directs our attention to parties to the
litigation rather than to ideas and issues, we analyze the regulation in this context before turning to other possible definitions of impartiality. We consider whether the partisanactivities clause actually addresses this compelling state

interest and, if so, whether it is the least restrictive means of
doing so.
In White, the Supreme Court found that the announce
clause failed the narrow tailoring aspect of the strict
scrutiny test, holding “indeed, the clause is barely tailored
to serve that [lack of bias] interest at all, inasmuch as it does
not restrict speech for or against particular parties, but
rather speech for or against particular issues.” Thus, the
Court found that clause was not narrowly tailored because
it failed to advance a compelling interest. The same is true
for the partisan-activities clause.
1. Unbiased Judges and the Narrow Tailoring
of the Partisan-Activities Clause
In one sense, the underlying rationale for the partisanactivities clause—that associating with a particular group
will destroy a judge’s impartiality—differs only in form
from that which purportedly supports the announce
clause—that expressing one’s self on particular issues will
destroy a judge’s impartiality. Canon 5, in relevant part,
forbids a judicial candidate from identifying with a political organization, making speeches to a political organization, or accepting endorsements from or even attending
meetings of a political organization, all of which are the
quintessence of political associational activity. And beyond
its importance in bringing about those rights textually
protected by the First Amendment, association, as earlier
noted, is itself an important form of speech, particularly in
the political arena. . . . Inasmuch, then, as the partisanactivities clause seeks, at least in part, to keep judges from
aligning with particular views on issues by keeping them
from aligning with a particular political party, the clause is
likewise “barely tailored” to affect any interest in impartiality toward parties. Thus, the Supreme Court’s analysis
of the announce clause under this meaning of “impartiality,” to wit judicial bias, is squarely applicable to the partisan-activities clause. . . . [*755]
We recognize that the difference between the direct
expression of views under the announce clause and
expressing a viewpoint under the partisan-activities clause
through association, is that the latter requires the aligning
of one’s self with other like-minded individuals—that is,
the members of a political party.
Political parties are, of course, potential litigants, as
they are in this case. Thus, in a case where a political party
comes before a judge who has substantially associated
himself or herself with that same party, a question could
conceivably arise about the potential for bias in favor of
that litigant. Yet even then, any credible claim of bias
would have to flow from something more than the bare
fact that the judge had associated with that political party.
That is because the associational activities restricted by
Canon 5 are, as we have pointed out, part-and-parcel of a
candidate’s speech for or against particular issues
embraced by the political party. And such restrictions, we
have also said, do not serve the due process rights of parties. . . . .
And in those political cases where a judge is more personally involved, such as where [a] redistricting case is a

dispute about how to draw that judge’s district, and even
in those cases discussed above that merely involve a political party as a litigant, recusal is the least restrictive means
of accomplishing the state’s interest in impartiality articulated as a lack of bias for or against parties to the case.
Through recusal, the same concerns of bias or the appearance of bias that Minnesota seeks to alleviate through the
partisan-activities clause are thoroughly addressed without “burning the house to roast the pig.” . . . .
Therefore, the partisan-activities clause is barely tailored at all to serve any interest [*756] in unbiased
judges, and, at least, is not the least-restrictive means of
doing so. Accordingly, it is not narrowly tailored to any
such interest and fails under strict scrutiny.
2. Impartiality Understood as “Openmindedness,”
and the Partisan-Activities Clause
The third possible meaning of “impartiality” articulated
by the Supreme Court in White, and the one around which
its analysis of the announce clause revolved, was
“described as openmindedness.” The Court explained,
This quality in a judge demands, not that he
have no preconceptions on legal issues, but
that he be willing to consider views that
oppose his preconceptions, and remain open
to persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending case. This sort of impartiality seeks to
guarantee each litigant, not an equal chance to
win the legal points in the case, but at least
some chance of doing so.
The Court stopped short, however, of determining
whether impartiality articulated as “openmindedness”
was a compelling state interest because it found that,
even if it were, the “woeful[] underinclusiveness” of the
clause betrayed any intended purpose of upholding
openmindedness.
We conclude that the partisan-activities clause is likewise “woefully underinclusive,” calling into question its
validity in at least two ways. First, it leads us to conclude,
before even reaching a compelling interest inquiry, that
like the announce clause, the partisan-activities clause was
not adopted for the purpose of protecting judicial openmindedness. Second, under a compelling interest analysis,
the clause’s underinclusiveness causes us to doubt that the
interest it purportedly serves is sufficiently compelling to
abridge core First Amendment rights. We conclude that
the underinclusiveness of the partisan-activities clause
causes it to fail strict scrutiny. [*757]
a. Underinclusiveness Belies Purported Purpose
Underinclusiveness in a regulation may reveal that
motives entirely inconsistent with the stated interest
actually lie behind its enactment. . . . The underinclusiveness manifests itself in the inherently brief period of
speech regulation during a political campaign relative
to the many other instances in which a judicial candidate, especially an incumbent who is a candidate, has
an opportunity to speak on disputed issues. The Court
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reasoned that if the purpose of the announce clause
were truly to assure the openmindedness of judges,
Minnesota would not try [*758] to address it through
a regulation that restricted speech only during a campaign since candidates’ views on contentious legal
issues can be and are aired in the many speeches, class
lectures, articles, books, or even court opinions given
or authored before, during or after any campaign.
The same is true of the partisan-activities clause. The
announce clause bars a judicial candidate from stating
his views on disputed issues though “he may say the
very same thing . . . up until the very day before he
declares himself a candidate.” The partisan-activities
clause bars a judicial candidate from associative activities with a political party during a campaign, though he
may have been a life-long, active member of a political
party (even accepting partisan endorsements for nonjudicial offices) up until the day he begins his run for a
judicial seat. A regulation requiring a candidate to
sweep under the rug his overt association with a political party for a few months during a judicial campaign,
after a lifetime of commitment to that party, is similarly
underinclusive in the purported pursuit of an interest
in judicial openmindedness. The few months a candidate is ostensibly purged of his association with a
political party can hardly be expected to suddenly open
the mind of a candidate who has engaged in years of
prior political activity. And, history indicates it will be
rare that a judicial candidate for a seat on the
Minnesota Supreme Court will not have had some
prior, substantive, political association. In sum, restricting association with a political party only during a judicial campaign, in supposed pursuit of judicial openmindedness, renders the partisan-activities clause “so
woefully underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous.”
As for the appearance of impartiality, the partisanactivities clause seems even less tailored than the
announce clause to an interest in openmindedness.
While partisan activity may be an indirect indicator of
potential views on issues, an affirmative enunciation of
views during an election campaign more directly communicates a candidate’s beliefs. If, as the Supreme
Court has declared, a candidate may speak about her
views on disputed issues, what appearance of “impartiality” is protected by keeping a candidate from simply
associating with a party that espouses the same or similar positions on the subjects about which she has spoken? . . . . Given this “woeful underinclusiveness” of
the partisan-activities clause, it is apparent that advancing judicial openmindedness is not the purpose that
“lies behind the prohibition at issue here.” [*759]
b. Underinclusiveness Betrays “Compelling” Claim
While it is not necessary for us to reach the question
of whether judicial openmindedness as defined in
White is sufficiently compelling to abridge core First
Amendment rights, we note that the underinclusiveness of Canon 5’s partisan activities clause clearly estab70 Court Review - Fall/Winter 2005

lishes that the answer would be no. Whether Minnesota
asserts a compelling state interest in judicial openmindedness is substantially informed by the fit between
the partisan-activities clause and the purported interest
at stake. A clear indicator of the compelling nature of
an interest is whether the state has bothered to enact a
regulation that guards the interest from all significant
threats.
We are guided on remand by the law enunciated in
White, and the Court’s words bear repeating: “[A] law
cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order, and thus as justifying a restriction upon
truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to
that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.” By its own
terms, Canon 5’s restrictions on association with “political organizations” apply only to “associations of individuals under whose name a candidate files for partisan
office”—political parties. Yet, if mere association with
an organization whose purpose is to advance political
and social goals gives Minnesota sufficient grounds to
restrict judicial candidates’ activities, it makes little
sense for the state to restrict such activity only with
political parties. There are numerous other organizations whose purpose is to work at advancing any number of similar goals, often in a more determined way
than a political party. Minnesota worries that a judicial
candidate’s consorting with a political party will damage that individual’s impartiality or appearance of
impartiality as a judge, apparently because she is seen
as aligning herself with that party’s policies or procedural goals. But that would be no less so when a judge
as a judicial candidate aligns herself with the constitutional, legislative, public policy and procedural beliefs
of organizations such as the National Rifle Association
(NRA), the National Organization for Women (NOW),
the Christian Coalition, the NAACP, the AFL-CIO, or
any number of other political interest groups. . . .
[*760] Yet Canon 5 is completely devoid of any restriction on a judicial candidate attending or speaking to a
gathering of an interest group; identifying herself as a
member of an interest group; or seeking, accepting, or
using an endorsement from an interest group. As a
result, the partisan-activities clause unavoidably leaves
appreciable damage to the supposedly vital interest of
judicial openmindedness unprohibited, and thus
Minnesota’s argument that it protects an interest of the
highest order fails.
c. Underinclusiveness Not Indicative
of a Legitimate Policy Choice
The panel majority in Kelly did not find the underinclusiveness of the partisan-activities clause troublesome. It viewed it as a legitimate policy choice: “when
underinclusiveness results from a choice to address a
greater threat before a lesser, it does not run afoul of the
First Amendment.” Association with political parties,
goes the argument, is a greater threat to judicial openmindedness than association with interest groups
because political parties have more power “to hold a

candidate in thrall.” But to determine [*761] whether
Minnesota has shown that association with political
parties poses a greater menace to judicial openmindedness than association with other political interest
groups, it is necessary to do at least some analysis of the
two supposed threats. While the opinion in Kelly purports to examine the “threat” posed by political parties,
it contains no discussion of any comparable danger
advanced by association with special interest groups,
despite ample record evidence that suggests the influence of these special groups is at least as great as any
posed by political parties.
Minnesota has simply not met its heavy burden of
showing that association with a political party is so
much greater a threat than similar association with
interest [*762] groups, at least with evidence sufficient
for the drawing of a constitutionally valid line between
them. As a result, cases granting some degree of deference to legislatures who seek to attack one form of a
problem before addressing another form are not applicable here. . . . [*763]
3. The Solicitation Clause
We now turn to an analysis of portions of the solicitation clause. The solicitation clause bars judicial candidates
from personally soliciting individuals or even large gatherings for campaign contributions. “In effect, candidates
are completely chilled from speaking to potential contributors and endorsers about their potential contributions
and endorsements.” And as the majority conceded in
Kelly, such restriction depends wholly upon the subject
matter of the speech for its invocation. Judicial candidates
are not barred from personally requesting funds for any
purpose other than when it is “related to a political campaign.” Restricting speech based on its subject matter triggers the same strict scrutiny as does restricting [*764]
core political speech. . . .
Moreover, the very nature of the speech that the solicitation clause affects invokes strict scrutiny. This is because
the clause applies to requests for funds to be used in promoting a political message. It bears repeating that “‘it can
hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee [of the
freedom of speech] has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office.’” And promoting a political message requires the
expenditure of funds. . . .
Since strict scrutiny is clearly invoked, the solicitation
clause must also be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Minnesota asserts that keeping judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds
serves its interest in an impartial judiciary by preventing
any undue influence flowing from financial support. We
must determine whether the regulation actually advances
an interest in non-biased or openminded judges.
Appellants challenge only the fact that they cannot solicit
contributions from large groups and cannot, through their
campaign committees, transmit solicitation messages
above their personal signatures. [*765] They do not challenge the campaign committee system that Canon 5 pro-

vides under which candidates may establish committees
that may solicit campaign funds on behalf of the candidate. “Such committees shall not disclose to the candidate
the identity of campaign contributors nor shall the committee disclose to the candidate the identity of those who
were solicited for contribution or stated public support
and refused such solicitation.” [Minn.] Canon 5, subd.
B(2).
a. Unbiased Judges and the
Narrow Tailoring of the Solicitation Clause
We first consider whether the solicitation clause
serves an interest in impartiality articulated as a lack of
bias for or against a party to a case. Keeping candidates,
who may be elected judges, from directly soliciting
money from individuals who may come before them
certainly addresses a compelling state interest in impartiality as to parties to a particular case. It seems
unlikely, however, that a judicial candidate, if elected,
would be a “judge [who] has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
[for or] against [a litigant in a case],” based on whether
that litigant had contributed to the judge’s campaign.
That is because Canon 5 provides specifically that all
contributions are to be made to the candidate’s committee, and the committee “shall not” disclose to the candidate those who either contributed or rebuffed a solicitation. Thus, just as was true with the announce clause
and its fit with an interest in unbiased judges, the contested portions of the solicitation clause are barely tailored at all to serve that end. An actual or mechanical
reproduction of a candidate’s signature on a contribution letter will not magically endow him or her with a
power to divine, first, to whom that letter was sent, and
second, whether that person contributed to the campaign or balked at the request. In the same vein, a candidate would be even less able to trace the source of
funds contributed in response to a request transmitted
to large assemblies of voters. So, the solicitation clause’s
proscriptions [*766] against a candidate personally
signing a solicitation letter or making a blanket solicitation to a large group, does not advance any interest in
impartiality articulated as a lack of bias for or against a
party to a case.
b. Openminded Judges and the
Narrow Tailoring of the Solicitation Clause
We next consider whether the solicitation clause as
applied by Minnesota serves an interest in impartiality
articulated as “openmindedness.” Put another way,
would allowing a judicial candidate to personally sign
outgoing solicitation letters, or to ask a large audience
to support particular views through their financial contributions, in some way damage that judge’s “willingness to consider views that oppose his preconceptions,
and remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise in
a pending case”? We think not. Given that Canon 5 prevents a candidate from knowing the identity of
contributors or even non-contributors, to believe so
Fall/Winter 2005 - Court Review 71

would be a “challenge to the credulous.” Thus,
Minnesota’s solicitation clause seems barely tailored to
in any way affect the openmindedness of a judge.
Accordingly, the solicitation clause, as applied by
Minnesota, cannot pass strict scrutiny when applied to
a state interest in impartiality articulated as openmindedness.
III. CONCLUSION

In White, the Supreme Court invalidated the announce
clause and remanded the case to this court. Upon further consideration of the partisan-activities and solicitation clauses in
light of White, we hold that they likewise do not survive strict
scrutiny and thus violate the First Amendment. We therefore
reverse the district court, and remand with instructions to
enter summary judgment for Appellants.
LOKEN, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I concur in Parts I, II.B, II.C, II.D.1, and II.D.2 of the opinion of the court. I concur in Part IV of Judge John R. Gibson’s
dissent and therefore dissent from the holding that Appellants
are entitled to summary judgment invalidating the solicitation
clauses. I otherwise concur in the judgment of the court.
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, with whom GRUENDER and
BENTON, Circuit Judges, join, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment.
I concur in Parts I, II.B, II.C introduction, II.C.2, II.D introductory text, II.D.1, II.D.2.a, II.D.2.c, II.D.3, and III of the
opinion of the court, and in the judgment of the court.
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, with whom McMILLIAN
and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.
The Court today strikes down the partisan activities clauses
and the solicitation restriction as a matter of law, by summary
judgment, ruling that the interests at stake are not compelling
and that the clauses of Canon 5 are either too broad, or not
broad enough, to justify their own existence. Preserving the
integrity of a state’s courts and those courts’ reputation for
integrity is an interest that lies at the very heart of a state’s ability to provide an effective government for its people. The word
“compelling” is hardly vivid enough to convey its importance.
The questions of whether that interest is threatened by partisan
judicial election campaigns and personal solicitation of campaign contributions, and whether the measures Minnesota has
adopted were crafted to address only the most virulent threats
to that interest, are in part factual questions, which we should
not decide on summary judgment. [*767] Finally, the Court
today adopts an approach to strict scrutiny that would deny the
states the ability to defend their compelling interests, no matter
how urgent the threat. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I.

The partisan activities clauses and the solicitation restriction each serve an interest that is and has been recognized as
compelling—protecting the judicial process from extraneous
coercion.
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A.
In the district court, the Minnesota Boards argued that
the state’s compelling interest was in protecting judicial
independence and impartiality, concepts that were not further defined, perhaps because the Boards considered their
meaning apparent. When the announce clause was before
the Supreme Court, the opinion authored by Justice Scalia
determined that further definition and analysis were essential in order to determine whether impartiality was a compelling state interest and whether the announce clause was
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Justice Scalia
divined three possible meanings for judicial “impartiality.”
The last meaning was “open-mindedness.” . . . . Because
the announce clause was “woefully underinclusive” to serve
any interest in judicial open-mindedness, Justice Scalia concluded that Minnesota had not adopted the announce
clause in order to further such an interest; he therefore
found it unnecessary to consider whether preserving “judicial open-mindedness” was a compelling state interest.
Since White, the New York Court of Appeals has held that
judicial open-mindedness is a compelling interest because
“it ensures that each litigant appearing in court has a genuine—as opposed to illusory—opportunity to be heard.”
After White, by order of December 9, 2003, the
Minnesota Supreme Court created an Advisory Committee
to review its Canons 3 and 5 in light of White. . . .
Following the Committee’s report, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held its own hearing and received public comment.
In September 2004, the Minnesota Supreme Court amended
Canon 5 to add a definition of impartiality that explicitly
includes open-mindedness:
“Impartiality” or “impartial” denotes absence
of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as
maintaining an open mind in considering
issues that may come before the judge.
Canon 5E (as amended Sept. 14, 2004).
The Court today discusses open-mindedness as if the
concern were to protect [*768] judicial candidates from
experiences that would affect their subjective frame of
mind. Thus, the Court holds that the state’s interest cannot
be served by measures that only limit the candidate’s conduct during a campaign, not before: “The few months a candidate is ostensibly purged of his association with a political party can hardly be expected to suddenly open the mind
of a candidate who has engaged in years of prior political
activity.”
This answers the easy question but ignores the hard one.
The threat to open-mindedness at which the partisan activities and solicitation clauses aim comes not from within the
candidates, but from without and consists of the candidates
placing themselves in debt to powerful and wide-reaching
political organizations that can make or break them in each
election. This is a fundamental distinction between the partisan activities and solicitation clauses, on the one hand,
and the announce clause, which was at issue in White. A
central tenet of Justice Scalia’s opinion in White was that the
announce clause regulated a candidate’s relation to issues,
not people. The partisan activities and solicitation clauses

regulate how certain speech affects a judicial candidate’s
relations with people, and organizations of people, not the
candidate’s relations with issues.
Our Court’s concern with temporal underinclusiveness is
largely a result of its failure to address the threat to openmindedness from external pressure. The threat to openmindedness results from allowing the candidates to incur
obligations during a campaign that can affect their performance in office. . . . Once the partisan activities clauses are
gone, one may expect that party involvement will become
the norm, so that recusal [*769] would be pointless, since
all judges would be similarly compromised.
B.
“Open-mindedness,” in Justice Scalia’s terminology, is in
reality simply a facet of the anti-corruption interest that was
recognized in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) and subsequent campaign finance cases. . . . Corruption is a sufficiently serious
threat to our institutions that the government may (1) seek
to prevent it before it happens and (2) act against it in intermediate forms that are more subtle than bribery and explicit
agreements.
Admittedly, the concern with corruption in the campaign
finance cases focuses on payment of money. While the
solicitation clause also deals with money-raising, the partisan activities clauses do not, which distinguishes them from
the campaign finance cases. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Letter Carriers (1973) demonstrates that the concern with corruption and undue influence is not limited to
obligations resulting from payments of money. Letter
Carriers recognized the danger partisan allegiances posed to
neutral administration of justice. That case upheld
restraints imposed by the Hatch Act on executive branch
employees’ political activities, in part because of the effect
partisanship could have on the performance of their duties
. . . . The need for “neutrality” identified in Letter Carriers
is even more important for the judicial branch than the
executive. . . . . [*772]
C.
Although in White Justice Scalia observed that the parties
and this Court appeared to make no distinction between the
concepts of judicial “independence” and “impartiality,” in
its September 14, 2004 [*773] order, the Minnesota
Supreme Court explained its decision not to amend the partisan activities clauses partly by relying on the need for separation of powers: . . . . “As the executive and legislative
branches are inextricably intertwined with partisan politics,
maintenance of an independent judicial branch is reliant on
the freedom of its officials from the control of partisan politics.” The separation of powers interest is a concern for
institutional independence that is distinct from concern for
impartiality in any of the senses identified by Justice Scalia.
. . . Even the narrowest notion of federalism requires us to
recognize a state’s interest in preserving the separation of
powers within its own government as a compelling interest.

D.
The extent and severity of the threat to the state’s interests are factual questions that must be proven empirically.
In the proceedings in the district court, the Boards adduced
sufficient evidence of that threat so that summary judgment
for the plaintiffs would not have been appropriate. But
recent events make it far less appropriate that our Court
should enter judgment as a matter of law on questions of
fact as to which there is no record before us.
The record below contained the affidavit of a former governor of Minnesota who stated that he had a lifetime of
experience in understanding how Minnesota citizens “think
and feel” and that partisan judicial campaigns would lessen
Minnesotans’ confidence “in the independence of the judiciary.” A former Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated that partisan judicial campaigns would “put
pressure on judges to decide cases in ways that would
impress the judge’s supporters favorably.”
But far more important to our holding today is the fact
that the Minnesota Supreme Court has recently reconsidered the provisions of Canon 5 at issue here, held hearings,
and received public comment. . . . [*775]
The Court today errs grievously in issuing a ruling that
strikes the provisions based on the 1997 factual record
without considering the September 2004 record before the
Minnesota Supreme Court. Since the holding is based on a
factual record that antedates the most recent version of
Canon 5, one must question whether the Court’s holding
today even applies to the current version of Canon 5, based
as it is, on a 2004 factual determination which the Court
does not take into account.
E.
The Court today holds that Minnesota’s interest in judicial open-mindedness is not a compelling interest because
the solicitation and partisan activities clauses are “underinclusive,” meaning that they do not address all “significant
threats” to the state’s asserted interest. The Court today says
that underinclusiveness of a regulation will establish that
the state’s purported interest is not compelling . . . .
However valid that reasoning may be in cases where the
asserted interest is novel or questionable, it is not valid here
because the interests at stake in this case have already been
recognized as compelling. Compelling interests cannot be
negated simply because a particular measure adopted in
their name is deemed ineffective. The Court today acknowledges that avoiding judicial bias that denies litigants due
process is a compelling interest, whether or not a particular
measure furthers it effectively. Likewise, protecting the
integrity of the states’ courts has long been recognized as
compelling, and by the same reasoning, that interest cannot
be negated simply because a particular measure may not
protect it fully. . . . [*776] It is a misreading of the Supreme
Court’s underinclusiveness discussions, and, most significantly, a nonsequitur as well, to say that the interest in judicial integrity could be reduced to insignificance because
Canon 5 does not go far enough to protect it.
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F.
Preserving judicial open-mindedness, and the appearance of it, should be recognized as the same compelling
state interest in avoiding corruption interest that was identified in Buckley v. Valeo and the campaign finance cases.
Though it is the same anti-corruption interest, the need to
protect that interest is more urgent and vital in the context
of the judiciary because in that context outside influences
threaten litigants’ due process interest in adjudication in
accord with the law and the facts of their case. A further
state interest in preserving the separation of powers
between state branches of government should also be recognized as compelling. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
recently re-examined Canon 5 and clarified that the
Canon is meant to protect those state interests. Judicial
integrity and separation of powers are interests of the
highest importance in guaranteeing the proper functioning of state government and we have no warrant to deny
their importance.
II.

A.
Though the Court today errs in holding that underinclusiveness of a regulation can negate the importance of the
state’s interest in the integrity of its judiciary, underinclusiveness does indeed point to a different problem—it raises
an inference of pretext. Even where an asserted governmental interest is undeniably compelling, a failure to fully
address threats to that compelling interest can be evidence
of pretext. The governmental actor may have missed the target because it was not aiming at it, but was actually seeking
to accomplish some other, impermissible goal . . .
The Supreme Court has twice upheld speech restrictions
on strict scrutiny review where the measure was tailored to
[*777] address only the most critical threat to the governmental interest, even where some threat to the asserted
interest remained unaddressed. See Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce (1990), and McConnell v. FEC (2003).
. . . [*778]
B.
The question at issue in our consideration of the partisan
activities clauses, as in Austin, is whether there is a “crucial
difference” in the threat posed by some entities that justified
regulating them while leaving others unregulated. To rebut
the inference of pretext, the government must show that the
speech it has burdened poses a different, more serious threat
to its asserted interest than the speech it chose not to regulate.
Recently, the Supreme Court has held that the differences
between political parties and other interest groups could
warrant differential regulation of the two kinds of groups.
This distinction between political parties and other interest
groups was at issue in McConnell, where the Court considered Title I of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which
imposed restrictions on political parties’ fund-raising activities that were not imposed on interest groups, such as the
National Rifle Association, the American Civil Liberties
Union or the Sierra Club. The plaintiffs contended that the
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distinction violated Equal Protection. The Court held the
distinction was permissible, because
Congress is fully entitled to consider the realworld differences between political parties and
interest groups when crafting a system of campaign finance regulation. Interest groups do
not select slates of candidates for elections.
Interest groups do not determine who will
serve on legislative committees, elect congressional leadership, or organize legislative caucuses. Political parties have influence and
power in the legislature that vastly exceeds
that of any interest group . . . . Congress’
efforts at campaign finance regulation may
account for these salient differences.
Before the district court, the Boards contended that special restrictions on judicial [*779] candidates’ reliance on
political parties were necessary to protect Minnesota’s tradition of non-partisan judicial elections, which dates from the
enactment in 1912 of the statute making Minnesota judicial
elections non-partisan.
The Minnesota Supreme Court greatly amplified that
explanation when it decided to reject the Advisory
Committee’s proposed revisions to the partisan activities
clauses in September 2004. The supreme court order stated,
“We conclude that the restrictions on partisan political
activity contained in our Code of Judicial Conduct are too
important to undermine based on the possibility that they
may be vulnerable to constitutional attack, particularly as
we are convinced that there are sound bases for their constitutional validity.” The court then reviewed the history of
Minnesota’s commitment to non-partisan judicial elections.
The movement towards non-partisan judicial elections
was a reform movement meant to insulate judges from the
party machines that had captured the state courts during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Between
1910 and 1958, eighteen states adopted non-partisan judicial elections. Among states that elect their judges, the
majority use nonpartisan elections; currently, twenty states
have nonpartisan elections for at least some of their judgeships, as opposed to fifteen who have at least some partisan
elections. Among the states with non-partisan judicial elections, there [are] a wide variety of measures to enforce the
non-partisan character of the election; some states have few
such measures, but many have measures similar to those at
issue here. Thus, the idea that [*780] non-partisan campaigns might protect the judiciary from improper external
pressures is hardly a novel idea, but must be placed within
a broad national reform movement that still has significant
sway within the states. . . . [*781]
The hearing the Minnesota Supreme Court held before
the 1997 amendments to Canon 5 included consideration of
whether partisan activities restrictions should be limited to
political parties as defined in Canon 5 or whether they
should apply to other advocacy groups. There was testimony on both sides of that issue. In addition to the testimony of Judge Meyer (which the Court quotes [in a footnote]) and others against the definition adopted, DePaul

Willette testified:
Let’s assume that the rule is not in place and
two candidates in a race; one is endorsed by
the republican party, one is endorsed by the
democratic party. What do we have? We have
a party race. It’s not a nonpartisan contest. We
have a party contest which will lead us, in my
judgment, to the kind of fund-raising and the
problems that Illinois and Texas are facing
today with multi-million dollar budgets for
people who want to retain or gain judicial
positions.
Willette’s testimony also refutes the idea that the
Minnesota Supreme Court intentionally failed to address
the threat from partisan activity by single-issue interest
groups. Willette testified that one reason single-issue interest groups were not included in the partisan activities
clauses is that single-issue groups would require a commitment that would have been banned under the announce
clause at the time. Obviously, the announce clause can no
longer play any role in the regulatory scheme; however, the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s expectation that the announce
clause would serve to moderate a candidate’s relation with
interest groups was reasonable at the time and therefore
tends to show that the partisan activities clauses were effective at the time adopted. Moreover, the invalidation of the
announce clause has apparently had a profound effect on
the pressures on judicial candidates in that it is apparently
now common for organizations to send judicial candidates
questionnaires asking them to state their positions on an
array of disputed legal issues. See, e.g., North Dakota Family
Alliance, Inc. v. Bader (D.N.D. 2005) (example of “voter’s
guide” questionnaire submitted to judicial candidates in
North Dakota, including items asking candidate to agree or
disagree with statements such as: “I believe that the North
Dakota Constitution does not recognize a right to homosexual sexual relationships” and “I believe that the North
Dakota Constitution does not recognize a right to abortion.”). In light of the invalidation of the announce clause,
I believe a remand for further evidence on the issue of pretext would be more appropriate than for us to order summary judgment on a record with evidence supporting both
sides of the question.
Once again, the most pertinent evidence about the thinking behind the current Canon 5 is evidence that has not yet
been presented to the district court. . . . [*782]
McConnell demonstrates that the distinction between
political parties and other interest groups could be defended
as a valid response to “salient differences” between the kind
of threat each sort of organization poses to the state’s interests. In addition to its institutional experience with nonpartisan judicial elections since 1912, in 1997 the
Minnesota Supreme Court had before it some evidence validating the distinction between political parties and other
interest groups, and some challenging that distinction. It
resolved that conflict, concluding that political parties
posed the greater threat. The conclusion was reaffirmed in
2004 by a committee of lawyers and scholars charged with

the task of scrutinizing Canon 5 for constitutional problems, and later by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Our Court
errs in concluding as a matter of law that the distinction
between political parties and other interest groups is pretextual. The evidence as to this distinction is best considered by the district court on remand.
III.

Our Court’s underinclusiveness analysis goes astray by
failing to recognize a compelling interest and by failing to
allow the Boards to rebut the inference of pretext. Sections
I & II, supra. But the signal failing of the Court’s underinclusiveness analysis is that it envisions a kind of strict
scrutiny that simply cannot work when [*783] applied to
real cases because it does not take into account the need for
limited deference to the state’s attempt to solve the problems that besiege it.
“Deference” is not a word we associate with strict
scrutiny review, but there is indeed a place for limited deference, as shown in the recent case of Grutter v. Bollinger
(2003) (“The Law School’s educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to
which we defer.”). There are three reasons why we should
employ some limited deference to the judgment of the state
of Minnesota in this case, if after remand, we were satisfied
that the judgment was well-supported by cogent evidence
and the possibility of pretext had been rebutted.
The Court’s primary reason for striking the partisan
activities clauses today is that the provisions are underinclusive. The main thrust of the narrow-tailoring requirement is directly to protect speech rights by avoiding an
infringement broader than the need to protect the government’s interest: “The purpose of the test is to ensure that
speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the
goal, for it is important to assure that legitimate speech is
not chilled or punished.” Exacting, de novo review by the
courts to assure that the government has chosen the least
restrictive alternative directly protects the individual’s
speech right. The objection that a measure is underinclusive, on the other hand, cuts in the opposite direction; it
being the command of the First Amendment not to abridge
the freedom of speech, one is at first surprised to learn that
a law can offend the First Amendment because the law does
not forbid enough speech. The vice in an underinclusive
law is not that the underinclusiveness directly suppresses
speech but that it raises a suspicion of pretext—which is
just an inference, and which can be rebutted by sufficient
evidence. Even in questions subject to strict scrutiny, there
simply has to be some room for judgment about how wide
to cast the net, and it should be apparent that it is more
offensive to the First Amendment for a measure to be too
broad than to be too narrow. The problem with applying the
same kind of exacting, de novo review to underinclusiveness as we do to overinclusiveness is that the two requirements form a Catch 22 situation, in which a drafter’s very
effort to avoid overinclusiveness makes the measure vulnerable to attack for underinclusiveness. . . . [*784]
A second reason for some limited deference is that this is
a case of competing constitutional interests, so that whatFall/Winter 2005 - Court Review 75

ever protection is afforded First Amendment interests
comes at the expense of due process and separation of powers interests. . . .
Finally, this is a case in which the parameters of the evil
addressed cannot be outlined with a high degree of precision. The difficulty is that the threat to the governmental
interest is not from unambiguously evil conduct, but from
behavior that forms part of a continuum with desired
behavior—attempts of the citizenry to make their voices
heard in their government. The critical and difficult question posed by this case is that the danger to judicial neutrality comes from that sometimes salutary behavior, at the
point at which participation in the democratic process
becomes undue influence over judicial decisionmaking,
preventing a judge from acting as the law’s representative,
rather than as the representative of a political patron or
donor. That point will vary from candidate to candidate,
according to whether he or she is stubborn or persuadable,
experienced or naive, young or old, poor or independently
wealthy, ambitious or modest. No law can account for all
these imponderables without restricting some candidate
who would not have been swayed by temptation or leaving
some candidate at liberty to compromise himself. . . .
[*785]
. . . . When Congress grapples with such a protean concept as “undue influence on an officeholder,” the Supreme
Court applies strict scrutiny in such a way as to acknowledge that Congress’ task requires exercise of some judgment. In contrast to the Supreme Court’s approach, our
Court today takes a bludgeon to a state’s attempt to solve a
delicate problem.

However, the Court states that any candidate can flank the
campaign committee’s confidentiality obligation simply by
looking up public records showing who contributed to
whom. In light of the Court’s underinclusiveness analysis,
this reasoning will likely require us to condemn the entire
scheme as soon as the next plaintiff asks us to.
In sum, though strict scrutiny must, of course, be strict,
it must, at least in some instances, be applied with limited
deference to the decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment. If we
pretend that it is otherwise, we adopt a model for strict
scrutiny under which no state’s attempt to deal with certain
problems can survive, and so very real and dangerous problems must be left unaddressed. Every place where the line is
drawn is arguably either overinclusive, because too much
activism is restricted, or underinclusive, because too much
threat to judicial open-mindedness is tolerated. The courts
then occupy the enviable position of not being required to
say in advance what line would be permissible, but of being
privileged to veto every possible legislative attempt to draw
the line because it would have been possible to draw the
line somewhere else. If strict scrutiny is simply a way to
strike down laws, in which any law is doomed as soon as we
invoke strict scrutiny, it is a charade. That is not how the
Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny, nor should we
adopt this flawed methodology in our Circuit. Instead,
where the states or other branches draw the line in a place
which the governmental actor can defend, with convincing
evidence, as the place where the threat to its interest
becomes the most acute, the measure should pass strict
scrutiny, though it might have been possible for another
hypothetical decisionmaker to have moved the line an inch
in one direction or another.

IV.

The futility of requiring unattainable precision is illustrated by our Court’s treatment of the solicitation clause.
The basic scheme of the solicitation clause is to erect the
campaign committees as a barrier between the candidate
and contributor. As recently as 2002, all but four of the
states that had judicial elections prohibited candidates from
personally soliciting campaign contributions. The Court
today [*786] seems to implicitly approve the concept of
the campaign committee as a barrier between contributors
and the judge or would-be judge. Yet, in effectuating the
concept, there are necessarily details which could be moved
an inch one way or another. It is clear that for the candidate
to sign letters himself is one way to hack at the wall between
the candidate and contributor—presumably, that is why
Wersal wants to do it. It is perhaps true that the entire wall
would not fall down, but it would be somewhat less effective in achieving the goal of removing personal obligation
from the candidate-contributor relation. If each detail of the
scheme must be proved as critical, rather than as forming a
part of a scheme that works, then each detail, and therefore
the scheme as a whole, is foredoomed.
Moreover, while the Court’s ruling today seems to attack
only one small aspect of the solicitation-restriction scheme,
the ruling contains the seeds to strike the whole scheme.
Today Wersal asks only to sign solicitation letters himself
and to personally ask for money from large groups.
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V.

There can be no question that the interests at stake here
are compelling. There are questions of fact-first, as to
whether the threat to those interests posed by partisan
involvement in judicial elections and personal solicitation
of contributions are [*787] severe enough to warrant the
measures taken by the Minnesota Supreme Court and second, as to whether the particular remedy chosen was truly
selected for the asserted reason. I would remand to the district court for trial of these factual questions in light of new
evidence of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s most recent
deliberations on the subject. If the defendants prove by convincing evidence that the threat was as they assert and that
the clauses were adopted to remedy that threat, I believe the
clauses should be upheld as constitutional. Today’s ruling
invalidates Minnesota’s current attempts to preserve its
courts’ integrity and public repute without any evidence
having been heard on the most recent rule amendments. At
the same time, our ruling in effect dooms any future
attempt as well by adopting a form of strict scrutiny that no
measure will pass. I therefore respectfully dissent.

